Similarly, Martin Luther (1483-1546), in placing theological protest under the protection of secular power politics, would exploit the political aspirations of budding German principalities in the sixteenth century. In return, he would conveniently provide the German princes with a theological basis for political secession from the theocratic Holy Roman Empire. In like manner, Buddhism in China provided the petty kingdoms that had sprung up during the dissolution of the Han empire since the year 220, with a convenient theology for transition from ancient feudalism under a centralized authority to a fragmented political order of independent regional sovereign states. Analogous to the rise of European nationalism which would be a facilitating vehicle for the religious movement known as the Reformation which in turn would give birth to Protestant national states as political by-products, the fall of the Han dynasty (B.C. 206-220 A.D.) had not been independent of the growth of Buddhism in China. In fact, recurring official persecution of Buddhism in China throughout history has been motivated by the religion's persistent involvement in secular dissident politics. The corrupt impact of Buddhist politics on the ruling authority was deemed bu historians as being responsible for the tragic fate of the disintegrated Han dynasty. Luther would exploit the political aspirations of German princes to be independent of the Holy Roman Emperor to bolster his theological revolt from the Roman Catholic Church. But he would come to denounce peasant rebellions when the peasants would rebel against the same Protestant German princes. He would do so even though such peasant uprisings against the German princes would claim inspiration from the same theological ideas of the Reformation that had motivated the revolt against the Holy Roman Emperor by the same German princes for independence, even though such radical ideas had been advocated by Luther. However, even Luther's professed personal sympathy for peasant demands for improved treatment from their oppressive princes would not persuade him to endorse peasant uprisings. In fact, Luther could be considered a Stalinist. Or more accurately, Stalin would in fact fit the definition of a Lutheran diehard, at least in revolutionary strategy if not in ideological essence. Like Luther, Stalin would suppress populist radicalism to preserve institutional revolution, and would glorify the state as the sole legitimate expediter of revolutionary ideology. Early Protestantism, like Stalinism, would become more oppressive and intolerant than the system it would replace. Ironically, puritanical Protestant ethics celebrating the virtues of thrift, industry, sobriety and responsibility, would be identified by many sociologists as the driving force centuries later behind the success of modern capitalism and industrialized economy. Particularly, ethics as espoused by Calvinism which in its extreme would advocate subordination of the state to the Church, diverging from Luther's view of the state to which the Church is subordinate, would be ironically credited as the spirit behind the emergence of the modern Western industrial state. Early Buddhism, after its initial grass-root political successes in Tang China in the seventh century, would adopt similar Stalinist postures against further social revolution in following centuries, and it would always stop pragmatically short of demanding subordination of the state to religion. In the French Revolution, Robespeierre and the Committee of Public Safety, with a democratic program of its own to concentrate on the revolution, suppressed the "enrages", extreme revolutionism of Herbertism as well as Dantonist revisionism.